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TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ATTEMPTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE "ALLAIS" PARADOX 
Edward D. Booth 
University of Nebraska, Lincoln. 
A long standing debate among decision and value theorists concerns the 
consistency of individual as well as collective preferences. Two traditional yet 
diametrically opposed positions have been staked out. A von Neumann. 
Morgenstern decision theorist (hereafter reference to the von Neumann. 
Morgenstern system will be abbreviated NM) maintains that individual 
preferences are exhibited behavioristically and that from empirical observa. 
tions alone a consistent set of axioms can be (or have been) constructed 
which describe and predict individual decision making and, in addition, may 
be regarded as norms of future behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1953: 31-33). Others have denied that such a set of axioms fulfilling these 
descriptive, predictive and normative demands have been (or can be) 
constructed. Their counter-argument, in part, is based on the Allais paradox, 
Following Allais they contend that individual values are an intuitively given 
normative network which does not exhibit a sufficiently strict correlation 
with preferences so as to fulfill the NM demands. Consequently they claim 
that empirical behavioristic observations alone will not provide one with the 
information from which a consistent set of axioms can be constructed such 
that these axioms will be complete in the NM sense, i.e., at once descriptive, 
predictive and normative of individual decision making. 
In this paper it wit! be demonstrated that any proposal which attempts a 
complete (1) descriptive, (2) predictive and (3) normative account of 
individual decision making within the NM system is futile, The outline of this 
proposed demonstration is as follows. First, the NM axioms are presented and 
the theorem of the maximization of expected utility is derived from them, 
Secondly, an account is given of the Allais paradox. This paradox resulted 
from Allais' questioning of the reliability of the NM system for the prediction 
of an individual's future choices. Thirdly, three proposed resolutions offered 
by Leonard J. Savage, Donald Morrison and Karl Borch, respectively, are 
presented. An examination of these proposals will reveal specific weaknesses 
of each one. Fourthly, it will be shown that all three solutions "fail" in a 
more general sense for they all exceed the boundaries of the NM system in a 
very fundamental way. Finally, a suggestion for a possible resolution of the 
Allais paradox will be put forth which will require the development of a new 
generalized decision theory. 
The NM axioms (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953: 26,27): 
We consider a system U of entities U,V,w, .... In U:l relation is given, u > 
v, and for any number ex, (0 < ex < 1), an operation; cxu + (I - ex)v = w. 
These concepts satisfy the following axioms: 
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(3: Al u >. v is a complete ordering of U. 
This means: WrIte u < v when v> u. Then: 
(3: A::l) For any two u, v one and only one of the following relations holds: 
u == v. II > v, u <v. 
(3:A:b) u>v,v>wimplyu>w. 
(3: B) Ordering and combining. 
(3: B:a) u < v implies that u < a u + (1 - a)v. 
(3:B:b) u > v implies that u> a u + (I - a)v. 
(3:B:C) u < w <v implies the existence of an a with au + (I - a)v < w. 
(3:B:d) u > w > v implies the existence of an a with au + (I - a)v > w. 
(3:C) Algebra of combining. 
(3:C:al au+(I -a)v=(I -a)v+au. 
(3:C:b) a(i3u + (I - i3)v = Tu + (I - T)v where T = aiJ· 
The system U - i.e. in our present interpretation, the system of 
(abstract) utilities - is one of numbers up to a linear transformation. 
The following is a condensation of a proof that the maximization of 
expected utility is a theorem of the NM axioms (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1953: 618-632). 
If we define u(a 1) = 1, u(an) = 0 then by (3:A:a) a 1 ?: x ?: an-
If there exists an aI, then by (3:B:c) and (3 :B:d) x ~(al aI, anan)· 
In a similar manner for y: y ~(i31 aI, i3nan)· 
By (3 :C:a) and (3 :B:d): (x ?: y) -+ (al aI, anan) .? (131 aI, i3nan) if and 
only if al ;;;. 131' 
By definition of u this is equivalent to u(x);;;' u(y). 
Thus the property of additivity of utility is satisfied under the NM 
axioms. 
$5Million 
II. :10 1. $1 Million 
11 $0 
$5Million 
.11 $1 Million 14 
.01 .89 
$0 $0 
95 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SClEC\iCES 
Diagram for the explication of the Allais Paradox (Morrison, 1967: 374): 
SITUATION I 
11 
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The paradox (Fig. I) is named for the French economist who first 
irllposl,d it, Maurice Allais (Allais, 1955). In this reconstructioIl of the 
f aradux the subject is asked to pick OIle of the two alternatives depicted in ~le diagram. In situation I the subject must choose between lottery 11 
(getting one million dollars for sure) and the lottery 12 (getting five million 
dllllars with a probability of .I 0, one million dollars with a probability of .89, 
or - with a probability of .01 - ending up with nothing.) In situation II, 13 
"iwS him a .I 0 probability of obtaining five million and a .90 probability of 
~ettin!l nothing: 14 gives a slightly better chance (.11) of obtaining only one 
~illiO;l dollars and a .89 probability of getting nothing. 
]\jost subjects (including myself) would prefer 11 to 12 if they were 
placed in situation L If placed in the less favorable situation II, they would 
prefer 13 to 14' (This is my preference as welL) 
The preference for 11 over 12 and, at the same time, 13 over 14 can be 
shown to be inconsistent with respect to the NM axioms and, in particular, 
inconsistent with the expected utility theorem derived from the NM axioms. 1 
This demonstration reveals that the subject in Situation J, by selecting 11 
over 12, is not maximizing his expected utility. But by virtue of his selection 
of 11 uver 14 in Situation II the subject has made a choice which does 
mHxi;llize his expected utility. This inconsistency between two pairs of 
preferences made at the same time, a violation of the theorem of maximizing 
expected utility, is the Allais paradox. 
First L. J. Savage's attempted resolution of this paradox will be 
examined. It is Savage's contention that the NM axioms are at once empirical 
and normative (Savage, 1954: 97) therefore the Allais paradox is for him a 
very real one. He admits that the selections of 11 over 12 and 13 over 14 at 
the same time have great intuitive appeal and indeed they are the choices 
which he himself would make. Although admitting that he has been lured 
into Allais' clever "trap" Savage is determined to escape. He writes (Savage, 
1954: 102): 
"In general, a person who has tentatively accepted a normative theory 
must conscientiously study situations in which the theory seems to lead him 
astray; he must decide for each by reflection - deduction will typically be of 
little relevance - whether to retain his initial impression of the situation or to 
accept the implications of the theory for it." 
1 Calculations ~ 11 = (LO) U ($1,000,000) > 12 = (.10) U ($5,000,000) + (.89) U 
($1,000,000) + (.01) U ($0) which computes as 11 = U ($1,000,000) > 12 = U 
($1,390,000) which is false mathematically. 
13 = (.10) U ($5,000,000) + (.90) U ($0) > 14 = (.11) U ($1,000,000) + (.89) U ($0) 
which computes as 13 = U ($500,000) > 14 = U ($110,000) which is true 
mathematically. 
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Because be believes his intuitive cllOlces luvc' vidimi/cll him into a 
violation of the NM axioms Savage decides that this ,itu:ltlun requires 
"conscientious study." His reflection bears fruit in an scheme 
which for him has intuitive appeal and additi,,)[]ally allows him to alter his 
selections so that they are consistent with the NM axioms. Savage's result 
permits him to preserve his "ratiunality" in the Nivl sense, 
Donald Morrison similarly admits he 1',;11 victim to the Alb!, paradox 
(Morrison, 1967: 373). He cl'llcedes that his choices are llKC·11Sls1c'nt with 
respect to the NM aXil'l1lS. To begin his attempted resoluti~)I\ of the paradox 
Morrisoll first examines Savage's proposal. Morrison's anaiy,;is and criticism of 
this approach may be summarized as follows. 
Savage maintains that since the NM ,'XIOl1lS are 1;,)lh empirical and 
nUi:,;ative they completely characterize rational decisiun making, past, 
pres(;lIt dnd futureo Since Savage wishes to behave in a rational, consistent 
manner he wishes to make his decisions in such a way that these choices are 
not inconsistent with the choices dictated by the NM axioms. What troubles 
Savage is that his original intuitive tlluugh inconsisteat with the NM 
system, did not seem to be irrational choices. Faced with this dilemma 
Savage's contention is that if a compelling argument can be put forth which 
induces one to aiter his choices !11 favor of the NM axiom, he will have 
succeeded in demonstrating that the original choices in violallun of those 
axioms were, if not irrational, at least lJllthinking and that on reflection one 
would prefer the choices gllided by the NM sYSlC'm. 
\Vhile Mornson docs not specifically [eject Savage's F:solution it is clear 
that he is not extremely impres'Sed with it for two reasons. First, Savage's 
argument used to persuade one to alter his original choices, if indeed one has 
made choices which are Allais paradoxical, does not have the intuitive appeal 
that the original choices themselves have. Damaging though this criticism may 
be Savage himself agrees with it (Savage, 1954: 103). Secondly, Morrison 
questions Savage's implied assumption that a person put in Situation II 
"should" have the same preferences when he is put in Situation l. 
Morrison's response to Savage's proposed resolution of the Allais paradox 
is to suggest an alternative approach; essentially Morrison i urns Savage's 
solution upside-down. Instead of changing his choices so that they are 
consistent with the NM axioms Morrison suggest adding assumptions such 
that the original, seemingly paradoxical, choices are absorbed consistently 
within a newly expanded axiomatic systenL 
Before proceeding with this approach Morrison suggests ~,no(hcl possible 
resolution of the paradox. Morrison contends that it might not be meaningful 
to compare the two luttery situations h"';;dSC they are so differcnL If such is 
the case this incomparability would 11<)[ allow (me to assert that any possible 
pairs of preferences were in,:onsistcn t ~.111rrisoll dlSlnisst's t his tack as simply 
ad hoc. 
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:\1('1' seriolls pJ,'posal cunsists in fllrmalizing three assumptions 
which IV:1,;;I J[,pcnded to the N~l axioms offer lme the opportunity to make 
'1]1[1''':\' ';\IL'i'l paradoxical choices but which, by virtue of his additional set "j:"", 
aSSllIllpti ,ns, arc consistent within this expanded axiomatic system (Fig. 2) 
\\LllTisOJl's assumptions are (Morrisoll, 1967: 378,379): 
l.t he: d"sirabilJiy of ending up with five million dollars is the same 
whether the subject's initial asset position was zero or one million dollars. 
SitJlibrh. the desirahility of ending up with one million dollars is the same 
'regardk';; lIf whether the initial asset position was zero or one million dollars. 
Also, fiy.:: million dollars is preferable to one million dollars. 
~. It is less desirable to have an initial asset position of one million dollars 
and lose it thall to start with nothing and lose nothing. 
3. [dting the gain of five million dollars equal C*, and the loss of going 
from 011-: million dollars to zero equal C* there exist equilibrating 1T'S for the 
twO intermediate prizes of gaining one million dollars and remaining at zero 
dollars. 
It call be: shown that for certain pairs of 1T1 's and 1To's perferring 1 i and 
13 need nut be inconsistent with re,pect to Morrison's expansion of the NM 
system (Morrison, J 967: 381). Morrison's resolution consists in formalizing 
the concept of a subject's asset position into additional assumptions which 
when appended to the NM axioms has the result of confirming, under certain 
conditions, the consistency of typical Allain choices. 
Karl Borch, yet another victim of the Allais paradox, proposes yet 
another resolution (Borch, 19.68: 488,489). His prop.:sal is fashioned after 
Savage in tha t he intends to provide an intuitively appealing argument which 
would persuade one to realign his choices in conformity with the NM system 
if they do not 81ready so conform. But Borch goes a bit further than Savage 
because uniike Savage Borch does not consider the Allais paradox a genuine 
one; rather hc calls it a "trap." Presumably it is a "trap" for the 
"unsophisticated," as Borch labels them, because the question, the Allais 
choices, are not presented in a "neutral" manner. For this reason Borch 
concludes that even Savage and Morrison are trapped into believing that 
normal people would prefer a sure million to a lottery among chances at five 
million, a million and nothing. Borch writes (Bc)[ch, 1968: 489), 
"Both authors and the subjects may have been dazzled at the pro~pect of receiving a 
million with certainty, and forget to ask themselves what they actually will do with the 
money once they get it. It is not likely that they can or will spend it all, nor that they 
will put all the money into a savings bank. We would not be surprised if they spent only 
a small part of the money, and invested the rest in securities with a good growth 
potential and small risk. This means, however, that 11 is exchanged for something very 
similar to I 2'" 
Concerning Borch's conclusion Ole Hagen has this rebuttal. He writes, in 
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2. ( 0--0) >- (1-0) 
J. (1-+5) = C .. 
-(0-+0) 
(1--0)=C .. (1-0)=C 
FIGURE 2 
Diagram for the explication of the Morrison Assumptions (Morrison, 1967: 379): 
1. ((0 -+ 5)) ~ (I -+ 5)) > ((0 -+ 1) ~ (1 -+ 1)) 
2. (0 -+ 0) > (1-+0) 
3. 
- (1 -+ 5) = C* 
(1 -+ 0) = C* 
(1 -+ 5) = C* 
~ 1-7TO~ __ (l-+O)=C* 
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a letter cummunicating with the editor of the journal Theory and Decision W. 
Leinfellner, 
"Th,' suggestion that the person who would reject the 1 % risk of losing a fortune in 
durn for a 10% chance of increasing that fortune five times is one who is acting in an 
~l_considcrcd fashion because should he get his sure million he would proceed to invest 
"most" of his fortune in growth stocks is beside the point. The point is that even if the 
ossessor of the million dollars did invest most of his money he would not risk losing it 
;11. Therefore the comparison Barch strikes is fraudulent. Borch's comparison, if 
accepted, is the real "trap." 
Hagen apparently is suggesting that Borch is illegitmately converting the 
Allais choices, which involve a sure-thing alternative, into choices none of 
which is a sure-thing and all of which involve wme element of risk. Hagen's 
criticism is well-taken. Further Borch is advising that one should treat all 
one's decisions as risky ones. n is this "should" which gives rise to concern. 
What is to be made of these proposals? Savage's solution would appear to 
make only the rigidly rule-bound individuals rational. But is this always so? 
Borch's resolution appears to make only the stock-broker types rational. 
But is this always so? 
Both Savage and Borch conclude that Allain paradoxical choices are 
irrational. or at least ill-considered. Their premise is that the NM axioms 
provide a complete descriptive, predictive and normative framework for 
individual and collective decision making. Is this premise acceptable? 
Morrison's reformulation of the consistency conditions embodies an 
appeal to a more broadly based reconstrual of "rational" behavior. Critics of 
Morrison's proposal may contend that his resolution ma~es a mockery of a 
general decision procedure. This criticism is made plausible by the specific 
character of Morrison's additional assumptions which clearly reveals the ad 
hoc nature of his proposal. 
Morrison's proposed "resolution" is, however, open to a more damaging 
criticism. Rather than the resolution of a paradox Morrison has, instead, 
produced an antinomy; i.e., the mutual contradiction of two inferences 
deducible from one set of premises. 
Allais apparently was looking for a resolution of his paradox within the 
NM system, if such a resolution were to be found_ Morrison has not supplied 
this. It is true that Morrison's additions to the NM axioms have made it 
possible to deduce the preferences which Allais found intuitively attractive_ 
Unfortunately the preferences which are NM consistent are also derivable 
from this expanded system. But, of course, these pairs of preferences 
contradict one another in the sense that the NM pair exhibit the expected 
utility theorem whereas the Allain pair do not. Thus an antinomy is revealed, 
The source of the antinomy is apparent. In the expanded NM system we 
have Morrison's notion of utility which entails the maximizing of expected 
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utility based on one's asset position juxtaposed with the NM concept of 
utility which is straight-forwardly a mathematical maximization of expected 
utility. Were these two concepts of utility formalized as axioms (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern have done this for their notion of utility; 
Morrison has not done this although as we have recounted he has sketched 
informally his intentions here) it would be clear that these axioms were 
contradictory thus rendering the putative NM-Morrison set of axioms 
inconsistent. Consequently Morrison's resolution reduces to the trivial for he 
has only deduced a contradiction from an inconsistent set of axioms. 
Morrison's proposed resolution of the Allais paradox has failed. The first 
of his attempts was self-admittedly ad hoc. The second of his attempts is 
trivial. 
In conclusion we claim that anyone who attempts a conterminous (1) 
descriptive, (2) predictive and (3) normative account of individual and 
collective decision making within the NM system (or in an expanded NM 
system in the intended sense of Morrison) makes extravagant demands which 
will remain unfulfilled. This conclusion is a consequence of the incompati_ 
bility of requirements 1, 2 and 3 within the NM framework. 
The first demand, the descriptive, requires the collection of sufficient 
empirical preference data. Nothing, in principal, would frustrate the 
fulfillment of this request. 
The second demand, the predictive, requires the assumption that human 
nature and, in particular, human preference behavior is essentially fixed. 
Theories in the physical sciences all make an implicit appeal to a similar 
principle of constancy. Perhaps in the physical sciences this assumption is 
innocuous. In the social sciences this assumption certainly requires investiga-
tion and, at our present state of knowledge, remains problematic at best. 
The above aside we should like to focus briefly on the third demand, the 
normative. 
One of Morrison's criticism of Savage's resolution was Savage's implicit 
assumption that a subject "should" respond in Situation I as he responded in 
Situation II for the sake of preserving his NM consistency. Borch's resolution 
was criticized for Borch demanded conformity with the NM axioms and 
further he demanded that one "should," when making deeisions, always 
weigh uncertainty and risk. Morrison suggests that one "should" mind his 
asset position before he makes an economic plunge. This advice is offered 
within the context of the expanded NM system. All three of these gentlemen 
clearly demand that the subject oblige himself to follow certain norms. Thus 
the problem of the third, the normative, requirement. 
Nowhere in the NM system or its modification as proposed by Morrison 
will one find the words, "should" or "ought" expressed in norms, obligations 
or deontic prescriptions. To satisfy the normative demand an assumption of 
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this sort must be added to the syskm. But an addition of . iii" kind of 
assumption takes us beyond the buund;J[ies of th N~II system as E is now 
conceived. Therefore within the context of the NM system no resolution of 
the Allais paradox is possible. Neverthek,s even though the Allais paradox is 
insoluble in the NM framework it still remains a serious problem for decisiun 
theorists. It would be presumptuous to propose to eliminate this problem as 
casually as the above suggests. Accordingly the outline of a tentative solution 
of the general problem posed by the paradox is set forth. 
Rules frequently govern individual and collective decision making as 
obligations or norms for a specific case. Sometimes these rules arc made quite 
explicit and arc codified as laws. More often these rules are informal, implicit. 
perhaps even unknown. Whatever the form these rules may take, be,cause of 
their clcontic aspect, they may allow us to give the NM system the same 
interpretation as regards individual choices for the future as we interpreted 
the system for individual choices in the past. What we desire then is a new 
generalized decision theory which will couple the NM systrm with obligations 
or norms of rational behavior. 
For a start we may safely assume that norms of rational behavior, as all 
specific rules, will have an "if ... then" character. For example, if you wish 
to win at chess then you must play expertly, of course, but first you must 
know and obey the rules of the game. If you do not wish to win at chess and 
further don't even wish to play the game you have, of course, no need to 
know or obey the rules. Similarly, if you are convinced of the efficacy of the 
NM axioms you may believe you should make choices in conformity with 
them. Perhaps you will select another system a la Morrison. Regaruless, the 
advantage of viewing decisions as rule-bound is that it enables one to see 
clearly that a condemnation of particular choices as irrational makes no sense 
unless one understands the normative framework within which the s;; bject 
believes himself to be operating. 
Leinfellner has suggested an approach similar to this (Leinfellnet, 1973). 
He has proposed that a union of the NM system with decision rules using 
deontic operators may permit us to give this supplemented NM system an 
interpretation concerning decision making for the future, depending upon the 
deontic formulation used. Whatever the form this final reconstruction may 
take we are sure that it will provide for a construal of the nature of values in 
the Allain sense along with the preservation of the NM system all within a 
new generalized decision theory. Only when this occurs can the Allais 
paradox truly be resolved. 
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